CHARLES
TEGART : HERO OR VILLAIN?
(Published in The Statesman on 13 August 2014 under title "Relevance of Tegart")
I
grew up on stories my father told me about the legendary Calcutta Police
Commissioner Charles Tegart’s exploits as a policeman and detective. I thought
about Tegart off and on in course of nearly forty years with the Indian Police
Service. He had a sixth sense for unearthing plots, criminal or political A
look at Tegart’s memorabilia in the Calcutta Police Museum rekindled my
interest in him. If Tegart could develop a network of informers among the
Bengal revolutionaries why have our police and intelligence agencies not been
able to penetrate the Maoist den? As I researched Tegart’s profile I wondered
if there is a message for those involved in containing the spreading footfalls
of left extremism in our country.
Sir Charles Augustus Tegart (1881-1946) was
born and brought up in Ireland. He competed into the Indian Police (1901-1931)
and joined the Bengal cadre which then included what is now Bihar, Jharkhand
and Orissa.. After serving as SDPO of Patna City, in which capacity he was this
author’s grand predecessor removed sixty years, he was promoted as Acting
Deputy Commissioner of Calcutta Police. He
became closely involved in the suppression of Bengal revolutionaries dedicated
to overthrowing British rule; he was hailed as a hero by the European community
but reviled as a villain by the Indians.
The 1905 partition of the province was viewed
as a national insult by Bengalis who began to see armed resistance as necessary
to secure Indian self-government. Bengal revolutionaries travelled to Paris to
learn bomb-making techniques from Russian anarchists, (Where did the Indian Maoists
learn making bombs and laying land mines?). In 1913 Tegart was appointed to the newly-established Intelligence Branch
of the Bengal CID, where he was tasked to gather information, call it
intelligence, about the main players of the revolutionary movement which was
then raging in the province. His Irish origin gave him a better understanding
of the problem. The majority of Tegarts’s Indian subordinates were Bengali bhadralok and thus from the same
background as the revolutionaries themselves. For Tegart to motivate them to
act against their own people is a lesson in leadership. He was fair and
supportive and they in turn were fiercely loyal to him.
Tegart quite enjoyed his job and proved highly
resourceful and innovative. H also made good use of the Defence of India Act
which was then in force. Such was his enthusiasm that he often joined or led
the raiding party acting on his own information. One of the most famous
examples occurred as a sequel to the well known uprising by Bengal
revolutionaries, the Chittagong Armoury Raid, in April 1930. When the Calcutta
police received information that a number of raiders had taken refuge in the
French enclave of Chandernagore to the north of Calcutta, Tegart organised a
group of heavily-armed British police officers to capture them. He gained the
permission of the French authorities to carry out an illegal attack in the
middle of the night, and, after a short gun battle, most of the suspected
revolutionaries were captured. He superannuated a few months later.
Hero
or villain, Tegart had proverbial cat’s nine lives from the way he survived
several attempts on his life. He had a dare-devil approach to fighting terror
and preferred to lead from the front even in penetrating the revolutionary
cells. The sight of Tegart driving through the streets of Calcutta in an open
car with his faithful dog perched on the hood behind him did more than anything
else to keep up the morale of his team. He devised his own techniques of
interrogation which did not rule out the use of third degree. Annie
Besant, of the Indian National Congress, accused him of punching suspects and
threatening one with a gun; Tegart was not bothered while the government winked
at the allegation. He
was obviously not above the circumvention of law and procedure to achieve
results; but then he did not have to bother about the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
Human Rights Commission or the Civil Liberty groups.
In
spite of his lack of resemblance to a Bengali Tegart did not shy away from
using disguise as a tool for intelligence work; he liked to take his chance. He
is believed to have once visited the Sonagachi red-light district of Calcutta
in the disguise of a Bengali gentleman talking with pimps and prostitutes. At
night, wearing a beard and puggaree, he could comfortably pass as a Sikh
taxi-driver, and even in the daytime he could go unnoticed as a Kabuli or
Pathan.
Tegart
had an uncanny knack of spotting potential informers and recruiting them. But that
was always on one to one basis. He would much rather kill an information than
risk revealing a source. The identity of many informers was known only to
Tegart himself, who met them always at night, in some lonely place previously
agreed on, and rarely took notes but committed the whole of what he was told to
memory. David Petrie, former Director of the Intelligence Bureau of the
Government of India, and later head of the British MI5, regarded Tegart as one
of the best officers at recruiting informants, cross-checking their
information, and keeping the confidences of his agents. One should not dismiss
all this as stories from a bygone era but look for lessons in how to infiltrate
the Maoist network. If a foreigner could develop a network of informers and
undercover agents why can’t we?
Like
most Inidan Police officers Tegart too volunteered to fight for his county in
the First World War. Refused permission to enlist Tegart remained
in India, monitoring plots to import armaments from Germany, Britains’s enemy
and thus a friend of the Indian revolutionaries. Here again is a lesson from
Tegart for our police and intelligence agencies how to monitor and choke the
channels through which the Maoists receive their supply of arsenal.
After the war was over Tegart’s services were
used by the British government for odd jobs connected with intelligence and
protection. In a hush- hush posting in France and England he is believed to have
rendered valuable service in the counter-espionage work against the Bolsheviks.
From July to November 1920, Tegart served as an intelligence officer in Ireland
during the Anglo-Irish War, when he was one of several Indian police officers
imported to bolster flagging British intelligence networks. He was regarded as
an expert on both Irish and Bengali ‘terrorism’. In 1923 Tegart was appointed Police
Commissioner of Calcutta. After his retirement in 1931 he served for
six years on the Council of India, the first member of the Indian Police to be
so honoured.
After
the War the Ottoman Empire had been dismembered and the Jewish settlement in Palestine
had been placed under British Mandate. In 1937 Tegart was offered the post of Inspector
General of the Palestine Police based on his experience in India. He declined
the post but accepted a mission to reorganise the police force to combat Arab
terror there. Tegart
recommended building a series of police forts across the country, to serve as
well-defended positions and bases for suppressing revolt, and to prevent the
infiltration of armed Arab guerrillas from Syria and Lebanon. The forts were
also to be used as government offices in areas that were regarded as unsafe.
A 2- metre high barbed-wire fence ran all along the frontier with Lebanon and
Syria. Giving Tegart full credit for this initiative these were colloquially
referred to as Tegart’s Forts and Tegart’s Wall. He also had some fifty
fortified police stations built to preempt surprise attacks. Looks like these
can be tried, with suitable modifications, in our Maoist-affected areas too.
Tegart, more than anyone else, was
responsible for crushing the revolutionary terrorism in Bengal in the first two
decades of the twentieth century. As a patriotic Indian one may hate him but
cannot detract from his effectiveness as a police officer. Tegart had a
charismatic personality but the purpose here is not to glorify him but to see
if his strategy of tackling the Bengal revolutionaries could be selectively
adopted by our police and intelligence agencies in dealing with the Maoist
menace. Tactics will have to be modified considering the time gap of a century;
our Constitution and laws do not give us the leeway which Tegart had. Of particular interest will be his building up
a network of informers within the revolutionary groups, pitting bhadralok against bhadralok. Not all so-called Maoists are committed and hard core and attempt can be made, and surely
must have been made, to win some of them over. For that mutual trust has to be
built up over a period of time. Although the area to be covered is very large
Tegaart’s Forts and Tegart’s Wall can be tried on an experimental basis.
Dr Sudhir Kumar Jha
(The author is a former Director General of
Police, Bihar)